# Uncertainty quantification: learning from flawed mechanistic models 

Richard Wilkinson<br>University of Sheffield

## What is Uncertainty Quantification（UQ）

Uncertainty Quantification（UQ）$\equiv$ statistics with complex models
－determining statistical information about the uncertainty in an output of interest that depends upon the complex model
－A＇complex model＇is one that is expensive to evaluate．

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- Sensitivity analysis: $\theta=\left(\theta_{1}, \ldots \theta_{p}\right)^{\top} \sim \pi(\cdot)$. If we can measure one component of $\theta$, which should we choose to minimize $\operatorname{Var}(Y)$ ?
- Design: what data should we collect to learn $\theta$, improve $f$, etc?
- Decision making: my model is uncertain, the parameters are uncertain, the data is noisy, but I need to make a decision...


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UQ should be a synergy between statistics, applied mathematics and domain sciences


## Mechanistic models

Models describe hypothesised relationships between variables.

## Mechanistic model

- explains how/why the variables interact the way they do.
- parameters may have physically meaning
e.g. ODE/PDE models

Phenomenological/statistical/empirical/machine learning models

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Typical problems with mechanistic models

- computationally expensive
- difficult to work with, e.g., black boxes
- often inaccurate - model misspecification
- often deterministic

Why do we need UQ？

## Atrial fibrillation



Atrial fibrillation（AF）－rapid and uncoordinated electrical activation （arrhythmia）leading to poor mechanical function．
－Affects around 610,000 people in UK．
－Catheter ablation removes／isolates pathological tissue that sustain／initiate AF．
－ $40 \%$ of patients subsequently experience atrial tachycardia（AT）．

## UQ in Patient Specific Cardiac Models

With Sam Coveney, Richard Clayton, Steve Neiderer, Jeremy Oakley, ...
Aim: predict which AF patients will develop AT following ablation, and then treat for both in a single procedure.
 Use complex electrophysiology
simulation using monodomain Use complex electrophysiology
simulation using monodomain eqn on shell anatomy.

Accurate predictions require patient specific models, but clinical data is sparse and noisy.

We need to

- Estimate conduction velocity on the atrium using ECG measurements
- Infer tissues properties, including regions of fibrotic material
- Predict AT pathways
- Aid clinical decision making (accounting for uncertainty)


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\mathcal{F}=\left\{F_{\theta}: \theta \in \Theta\right\}
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If $G=F_{\theta_{0}} \in \mathcal{F}$ then we know what to $\mathrm{do}^{1}$.
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Interest lies in inference of $\theta$ not calibrated prediction.
${ }^{1}$ Even if we can't agree about it!

## An appealing idea

Kennedy and O'Hagan 2001

Most models are imperfect. . .

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Most models are imperfect．．．
Can we expand the class of models by adding a Gaussian process（GP）to our simulator？

If $f_{\theta}(x)$ is our simulator，$y$ the observation，then perhaps we can correct $f$ by modelling

$$
y=f_{\theta^{*}}(x)+\delta(x) \quad \text { where } \quad \delta(\cdot) \sim G P
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This greatly expands $\mathcal{F}$ into a non-parametric world.

## An appealing，but flawed，idea

Kennedy and O＇Hagan 2001，Brynjarsdottir and O＇Hagan 2014
Simulator

$$
f_{\theta}(x)=\theta x \quad g(x)=\frac{\theta x}{1+\frac{x}{a}} \quad \theta=0.65, a=20
$$

Solid＝model with true theta，dashed＝truth


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## An appealing, but flawed, idea

Bolting on a GP can correct your predictions, but won't necessarily fix your inference,e.g.

- No discrepancy:

$$
\begin{gathered}
y=f_{\theta}(x)+N\left(0, \sigma^{2}\right) \\
\theta \sim N(0,100), \sigma^{2} \sim \Gamma^{-1}(0.001,0.001)
\end{gathered}
$$

- GP discrepancy:

$$
\begin{aligned}
y=f_{\theta}(x) & +\delta(x)+N\left(0, \sigma^{2}\right), \\
\delta(\cdot) & \sim G P(\cdot, \cdot) \text { with objective priors }
\end{aligned}
$$




## Dangers of non－parametric model extensions

There are（at least）two problems with this approach：
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- A GP is an incredibly complex infinite dimensional model, which is not necessarily identified even asymptotically. The posterior can concentrate not on a point, but on some sub manifold of parameter space, and the projection of the prior on this space continues to impact the posterior even as more and more data are collected.
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ie We never forget the prior, but the prior is too complex to understand
- Brynjarsdottir and O'Hagan 2014 try to model their way out of trouble with prior information - which is great if you have it.
- We can also have problems finding the true optima for the hyperparameters, even in 1d problems:


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- Wong et al 2017 impose identifiability (for $\delta$ and $\theta$ ) by giving up and identifying

$$
\theta^{*}=\arg \min _{\theta} \int\left(\zeta(x)-f_{\theta}(x)\right)^{2} d \pi(x)
$$


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A frequentist approach to computer model calibration

## Inferential approaches

- Maximum likelihood/minimum-distance
- Bayes(ish)
- History matching (HM)/ABC type methods (thresholding)


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Try to understand why (at least anecdotally) HM and ABC seem to work well in mis-specified cases.

## Inferential approaches

- Maximum likelihood/minimum-distance
- Bayes(ish)
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We'll consider how they behave for well-specified and mis-specified models.

Try to understand why (at least anecdotally) HM and ABC seem to work well in mis-specified cases.

Big question ${ }^{2}$ is what properties would we like our inferential approach to possess.

## Maximum likelihood

Maximum likelihood estimator

$$
\hat{\theta}_{n}=\arg \max _{\theta} I(y \mid \theta)
$$

If $G=F_{\theta_{0}} \in \mathcal{F}$ ，then（under some conditions）

$$
\begin{aligned}
\hat{\theta}_{n} & \rightarrow \theta_{0} \text { almost surely as } n \rightarrow \infty \\
\sqrt{n}\left(\hat{\theta}_{n}-\theta_{0}\right) & \stackrel{d}{\Rightarrow} N\left(0, \mathcal{I}^{-1}\left(\theta_{0}\right)\right)
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Asymptotic consistency，efficiency，normality．

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Asymptotic consistency, efficiency, normality.
If $G \notin \mathcal{F}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
\hat{\theta}_{n} \rightarrow \theta^{*} & =\arg \min _{\theta} D_{K L}\left(G, F_{\theta}\right) \text { almost surely } \\
& =\arg \min _{\theta} \int \log \frac{d G}{d F_{\theta}} d G \\
\sqrt{n}\left(\hat{\theta}_{n}-\theta_{0}\right) & \stackrel{d}{\Rightarrow} N\left(0, V^{-1}\right)
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## Bayes

Bayesian posterior

$$
\pi(\theta \mid y) \propto \pi(y \mid \theta) \pi(\theta)
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If $G=F_{\theta_{0}} \in \mathcal{F}$

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\pi(\theta \mid y) \stackrel{d}{\Rightarrow} N\left(\theta_{0}, n^{-1} \mathcal{I}^{-1}\left(\theta_{0}\right)\right) \text { as } \quad n \rightarrow \infty
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Bernstein－von Mises theorem：we forget the prior，and get asymptotic concentration and normality．
This also requires（a long list of）identifiability conditions to hold．

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Often with non-parametric models (eg GPs), we don't even get this convergence to the pseudo-true value due to lack of identifiability.

## ABC (Approximate Bayesian computation)

## Rejection Algorithm

- Draw $\theta$ from prior $\pi(\cdot)$
- Accept $\theta$ with probability $\propto \pi(y \mid \theta)$

Accepted $\theta$ are independent draws from the posterior distribution, $\pi(\theta \mid D)$.

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Accepted $\theta$ are independent draws from the posterior distribution, $\pi(\theta \mid D)$.
If the likelihood, $\pi(D \mid \theta)$, is unknown:

## 'Mechanical' Rejection Algorithm

- Draw $\theta$ from $\pi(\cdot)$
- Simulate $y^{\prime} \sim \pi(y \mid \theta)$ from the computer model
- Accept $\theta$ if $y=y^{\prime}$, i.e., if computer output equals observation


## Rejection ABC

If $\mathbb{P}(D)$ is small (or $D$ continuous), we will rarely accept any $\theta$. Instead, there is an approximate version:

Uniform Rejection Algorithm

- Draw $\theta$ from $\pi(\theta)$
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- Simulate $y^{\prime} \sim \pi(y \mid \theta)$
- Accept $\theta$ if $\rho\left(y, y^{\prime}\right) \leq \epsilon$
$\epsilon$ reflects the tension between computability and accuracy.
- As $\epsilon \rightarrow \infty$, we get observations from the prior, $\pi(\theta)$.
- If $\epsilon=0$, we generate observations from $\pi(\theta \mid y)$.


## $\epsilon=10$



Density


$$
\theta \sim U[-10,10], \quad y \sim N\left(2(\theta+2) \theta(\theta-2), 0.1+\theta^{2}\right)
$$

$$
\rho\left(y, y^{\prime}\right)=\left|y-y^{\prime}\right|, \quad y=2
$$

## $\epsilon=7.5$



## $\epsilon=5$



## $\epsilon=2.5$

theta vs D


Density


## $\epsilon=1$

theta vs D


Density


## History matching and $A B C$

History matching seeks to find a NROY set

$$
\mathcal{P}_{\theta}=\left\{\theta: S_{H M}\left(\hat{F}_{\theta}, y\right) \leq 3\right\}
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for some choice of $S$ and $\epsilon$, and where $\hat{F}_{\theta}$ is estimated from the simulated $y^{\prime}$.
For ABC, typically $S\left(\hat{F}_{\theta}, y\right)=\rho\left(\eta(y), \eta\left(y^{\prime}\right)\right)$, and $\eta(\cdot)$ is a lower dimensional summary.

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They have thresholding of a score in common and are algorithmically comparable.

## History matching and ABC

These methods (anecdotally) seem to work better in mis-specified situations.

Why?

## History matching and $A B C$

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Why？
They differ from likelihood based approaches in that
－They only use some aspect of the simulator output
－Typically we hand pick which simulator outputs to compare，and weight them on a case by case basis．

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- Potentially use generalised scores/loss-functions
- The thresholding type nature potentially makes them somewhat conservative
- They don't require a fully specified discrepancy model.


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－Robustness to small mis－specifications？
－Ease of specification？

## Generalized scores

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i.e. predicting $G$ gives the best possibly score.

- Encourages honest reporting


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Examples:

- Log-likelihood $S(F, y)=-\log f(y)$
- Tsallis-score $(\gamma-1) \int f(x)^{\alpha} d x-\gamma f(y)^{\alpha-1}$

Minimum scoring rule estimation (Dawid et al. 2014 etc) uses

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For proper scores

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}_{\theta_{0}}\left(\left.\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} S\left(F_{\theta}, y\right)\right|_{\theta=\theta_{0}}\right) & =\left.\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \mathbb{E}_{\theta_{0}} S\left(F_{\theta}, y\right)\right|_{\theta=\theta_{0}} \\
& =0
\end{aligned}
$$

so we have an unbiased estimating equation, and hence get asymptotic consistency for well-specified models. We also get asymptotic normality.

Dawid et al. 2014 show that if

- $\nabla_{\theta} f_{\theta}(x)$ is bounded in $x$ for all $\theta$
- Bregman gauge of scoring rule is locally bounded then the minimum scoring rule estimator $\hat{\theta}$ is B -robust
- i.e. it has bounded influence function

$$
I F\left(x ; \hat{\theta}, F_{\theta}\right)=\lim _{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{\hat{\theta}\left(\epsilon \delta_{x}+(1-\epsilon) F_{\theta}\right)-\hat{\theta}\left(F_{\theta}\right)}{\epsilon}
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i.e. if $F_{\theta}$ is infected by outlier at $x$, this doesn't unduly affect the inference.
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## Bayes like approaches

What about Bayes like approaches with generalized scores?

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J. R. Statist. Soc. B (2016)

78, Part 5, pp. 1103-1130
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They argue the update must be of the form

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\pi(\theta \mid x) \propto \exp (-L(\theta, x)) \pi(\theta)
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via coherency arguments.
Note using log-likelihood as the loss function $\left(L(\theta, x)=-\log f_{\theta}(x)\right)$ recovers Bayes.

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- Allows focus solely on the quantities of interest.
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Relates to the Bayes linear approach of Goldstein and Wooff which is also motivated by difficulties with specifying a complete model for the data.

## HM and ABC thresholding

History matching was an approach designed for inference for mis-specified models.

$$
S_{H M}\left(F_{\theta}\right)=\frac{\left|\mathbb{E}_{F_{\theta}}(Y)-y\right|}{\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}_{F_{\theta}}(y)}}
$$

Often applied in a Bayes linear type setting, with $\operatorname{Var}_{F_{\theta}}(y)$ broken down into constituent parts

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\operatorname{Var}_{F_{\theta}}(y)=\operatorname{Var}_{\text {sim }}+\mathbb{V a r} \text { discrep }+\mathbb{V a r}_{\text {emulator }}
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Combined with the thresholding nature

$$
\mathcal{P}_{\theta}=\left\{\theta: S_{H M}\left(\hat{F}_{\theta, y}\right) \leq 3\right\}
$$

means we don't get asymptotic concentration.

- $A B C$ shares similar properties if $\epsilon$ fixed at something reasonable.

$$
\pi_{\epsilon}(\theta) \propto \pi(\theta) \mathbb{I}_{S\left(\hat{F}_{\theta}, y\right) \leq \epsilon}
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The indicator functions acts to add a ball of radius $\epsilon$ around the data, so that we only need to get within it.

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Both approaches also allow the user to focus on aspects/summaries of the simulator output that either are of interest, or for which we believe the simulator is better specified.

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Also

- Allow for crude/simple discrepancy characterization.
- Some form of robustness arises from the scores used.


## Brynjarsdottir et al. revisited

Simulator
Reality

$$
f_{\theta}(x)=\theta x \quad g(x)=\frac{\theta x}{1+\frac{x}{a}} \quad \theta=0.65, a=20
$$



Uniform MD on [-1,1]


GP prior on MD


Uniform MD on $[-0.5,0.5]$


## Recent work in ABC

Recent work on $A B C$ has sought to move away from the use of summaries

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Several papers (Frazier et al. 2017, Ridgeway 2017, ...) have studied asymptotic properties of $A B C$
- Consider version of $A B C$ where we accept or reject according to

$$
\rho\left(\eta(y), \eta\left(y^{\prime}\right)\right)
$$

where $y^{\prime} \sim F_{\theta}(\cdot)$
Then if $b_{0}$ is limit of $\eta(y)$ and $b(\theta)$ the limit of $\eta\left(y^{\prime}\right)$, then they've studied convergence to

$$
\theta^{*}=\arg \inf _{\theta} \rho\left(b_{0}, b(\theta)\right)
$$

as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$.
This focus is again on prediction not inference.

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- Whilst modelling our way out of trouble sounds attractive, in practice it often fails (rarely works?) due to lack of identifiability.
- Simple specification of discrepancies (Bayes linear?) look attractive in most cases. Should we just use inferential approaches that allow for this type of simple specification (ie which allow us to avoid full probabilistic models)?


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No one trusts a model except the person who wrote it; everyone trusts an observation except the person who made it, Harlow Shapely.

Thank you for listening!

